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I. Introduction
Educational resources distributed via the 
Internet are proliferating rapidly. These new 
resources include lecture videos, online 
teaching notes, Internet chat groups, online 
interactive problem sets with instantaneous 
feedback/grading, educational games, and 
many other developing technologies. Numerous 
institutions have created fully autonomous soft-
ware that grades student essays.1 In the popular 
press, MOOCs (massive open online courses) 
have received the most fanfare, though the social 
value of these courses is as of yet unproven and 
the high dropout rates (in excess of 90 percent) 
have been fodder for much debate.2
One technology that promises to be par-
ticularly scalable is lecture videos and other 
online teaching tools. These make the skills of 
the most effective teachers widely available to 
students around the world, making lecturing 
almost “nonrivalrous.” One prominent concern, 
however, is that these sweeping technological 
1 One leader is the edX consortium, which has produced 
EASE (Enhanced AI Scoring Engine), a “library that allows 
for machine learning based classification of textual content.” 
See https://readthedocs.org/projects/ease/. 
2 See Perna et al. (2013) for some empirical facts on the 
first 17 UPenn MOOCs offered; Banerjee and Duflo (2014) 
provide empirical evidence of certain factors that influence 
the success of MOOCs. 
Equalizing Superstars: The Internet 
and the Democratization of Education †
By Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, and John A. List*
* Acemoglu: Department of Economics, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 (e-mail: daron@mit.edu); 
Laibson: Department of Economics, Harvard University, 
1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: 
dlaibson@harvard.edu); List: Department of Economics, 
University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, 
IL 60637 (e-mail: jlist@uchicago.edu). We are grateful to 
participants in the Economics Education in the Digital Age 
session in the AEA 2014, and particularly to Gail Hoyt for 
comments, and to Colin Gray for research assistance.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.523 to visit 
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
sure statement(s).
changes will be disequalizing—as many of the 
leading technologies of the last several decades 
have been—creating winner-take-all “superstar” 
teachers and a wider gulf between different 
groups of students.3 These important concerns 
notwithstanding, we contend that a major impact 
of web-based educational technologies will be 
the democratization of education: educational 
resources will be more equally distributed, and 
lower-skill teachers will benefit.
At the root of our results are two observa-
tions. First, in the status quo, there is consider-
able inequality in the distribution of educational 
resources both within countries and especially 
between countries. Second, for web-based tech-
nologies to exploit the comparative advantage 
of skilled lecturers, these technologies will 
need to be complemented with opportunities for 
face-to-face discussions with instructors.
In the model we use to formalize these ideas, 
new human capital is generated using the exist-
ing human capital of students (arising from prior 
education or as a family endowment) and vari-
ous complementary teaching activities (e.g., lec-
turing, grading, class discussions, one-on-one 
conversations, etc.). Web-based technologies 
enable teachers to generate nonrival educational 
services that can be used as inputs in multiple 
countries/classrooms simultaneously (e.g., 
an Internet lecture that can be watched simul-
taneously in Beijing and Baltimore), but these 
still need to be complemented with one-on-one 
instruction provided by local teachers.
3 On superstar phenomena, see Rosen (1981); on the 
effect of technology on inequality over the last century, see 
Goldin and Katz (2008); on the effects of the recent wave 
of computerized and automated technologies on the wage 
and employment structure, see Acemoglu and Autor (2011); 
and on the rise of winner-take-all society more generally due 
to technological, sociological, and institutional reasons, see 
Frank and Cook (1996). 
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The ability to create nonrival educational 
services via the web generates four interrelated 
consequences.
The first is a two-part “technological windfall” 
for students: (i) students now have access to lec-
tures of the best (“superstar”) global teachers, 
rather than relying entirely on lectures from local 
teachers; and (ii) the teacher resources freed 
from lecturing are reallocated to other, comple-
mentary teaching activities. Both of these effects 
raise the educational attainment of all students in 
all countries (except the leader country).
The second consequence is a “democratizing 
effect,” which reduces inequality of human capi-
tal between students, since gains in educational 
attainment are disproportionately concentrated at 
the bottom of the educational attainment gradient.
The third consequence is an expected nega-
tive “crowd-out” effect on nonsuperstar teach-
ers, who are dislocated from their lecturing 
tasks. They instead focus on teaching activities 
that are not web-based, and due to diminishing 
returns in these tasks, their marginal product and 
thus wages are depressed.
The fourth consequence, however, is a 
“complementarity effect.” This offsets the third 
effect, and may lead to a net positive effect on 
the salaries of nonsuperstar teachers. Web-based 
technologies raise the quantity and quality of 
web-based educational inputs that are comple-
mentary for local teachers, thereby raising these 
local teachers’ marginal product and earnings.
A priori either the third or fourth effect could 
dominate. We show that the positive complemen-
tarity effect dominates for teachers with sufficiently 
low levels of human capital, while the crowd-out 
effect dominates for teachers with sufficiently 
high (but nonsuperstar) levels of human capital. In 
particular, teachers with skill levels below a criti-
cal threshold see their earnings increase.
To aid exposition, we refer to two human 
capital production regimes: the pre- and post-
Internet regimes.
A. Pre-Internet Allocation
The world consists of N islands (e.g., coun-
tries), each inhabited by a continuum s > 0 of 
students and a continuum 1 of teachers. Without 
loss of generality, we normalize s = 1.
We study the impact of technology in enabling 
cross-island application of teachers’ knowledge 
and skills. We assume that the human capital of 
all students before they enter formal schooling is 
the same within an island, and in each country j 
we denote this endowment by  e j . We also assume 
that the human capital of all teachers within an 
island is the same, given by  h j on island j. All 
teachers in the world have one unit of time.
The post-schooling human capital of students 
on island j, which we refer to as educational 
attainment, is also equal to their labor earnings, 
and is given by
(1) y j =  e j 1−α  X j α , 
where α ∈ (0, 1) and  X j is an aggregator of 
the teaching services supplied on island j. 
Specifically, we assume a Cobb-Douglas (unit 
elasticity) aggregator of the form
 ln  X j =  ∫ 0 1 ln  x j (i) di,
where  x j (i) is the amount of teaching task i avail-
able to students on island j.
The resource constraint for the skills and time 
of teachers on island j implies
  ∫ 
0
 1 x j (i) di =  h j .
The total supply of skills on island j is  h j (the 
skill level of teachers multiplied by their unit 
time endowment) and this can be allocated in 
any way across the different teaching tasks.
We assume that all services and teaching tasks 
are competitively priced, and teachers choose the 
allocation of their time and skills to these tasks 
given market prices. Since there are no externali-
ties, this allocation can be alternatively computed 
as the solution to the maximization problem of 
an island-level social planner maximizing aver-
age (or total) post-schooling human capital on the 
island.
In view of the concavity of the production 
function (1) in  x j (i), this allocation will involve
  x j (i) =  h j ,
giving a post-schooling human capital of
 y j =  e j 1−α  h j α ,
or, in logs,
(2) ln  y j = (1 − α) ln  e j + α ln  h j .
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In what follows, we assume that there is per-
fect rank correlation between  e j and  h j , mean-
ing that  e j >  e k implies  h j >  h k for all j, k. 
Intuitively, islands that have higher human 
capital students also have higher human capi-
tal teachers.4 Then, from (2), the cross-island 
distribution of  post-schooling human capital is 
more unequal than in the hypothetical case, in 
which all islands have access to the same quality 
teachers.
We can also determine the incomes of teach-
ers on different islands. These are given by the 
marginal contribution of teachers to student labor 
earnings (in a competitive equilibrium) times the 
supply of teaching skills. This can be written
(3)   w j =  ∂ y j  _∂ h j   h j = α e j 
1−α  h j α−1  h j 
 = α  e j 1−α  h j α .
From now on, we rank the islands in descend-
ing order of teacher skills, so that island 1 has 
the teachers with the highest value of  h j .
B. Post-Internet: Student Attainment
To operationalize the introduction of 
 web-based technologies, we imagine a techno-
logical change that enables a teaching task to be 
performed by a single teacher and then broad-
cast to the rest of the world. Only some teach-
ing tasks have this special nonrivalrous property, 
specifically those indexed from [0, β] for some β < 1. We use the term “lecturing” for those 
tasks that can be scaled to an arbitrary number of 
students at essentially zero marginal cost (e.g., 
creating video lectures or writing problem sets). 
We refer to the remaining tasks in the set, with 
mass (β, 1], as “hands-on instruction” (e.g., 
small group interactions), which need to be per-
formed by teachers on the same island as their 
students. For simplicity, we assume that each lec-
turing task uses exactly one unit of teacher time.
Given this new technology, lecturing tasks are 
performed by teachers on island 1, and thus stu-
dents in each island j = 1, … , N have access to
 x j ′(i) =  h 1 for all i ∈ [0, β] and j = 1, … , N,
4 In fact, all we require is that ln  e j and ln  h j are positively 
correlated across islands (e.g., normally distributed across 
islands with positive covariance). 
where throughout we use variables with a prime (e.g.,  x′ ) to denote post-Internet values. In view 
of this, and the resource constraint on island 1, 
the post-schooling human capital of students on 
island 1 does not change. In particular, the frac-
tion β of teachers will now be working in lectur-
ing tasks that are being broadcast to the rest of 
the world while the remaining 1 − β fraction of 
teachers work in hands-on instruction.
On other islands, however, the post-schooling 
levels of human capital will change for two 
reasons. First, the students have access to the 
higher quality lectures from “superstar” teach-
ers on island 1. Second, the teachers on islands 
j = 2, … , N can now focus on instruction, so 
instruction tasks are more abundantly supplied.
It follows that the post-schooling human capi-
tal of students on island j = 2, … , N is given by
 y j ′ =  e j 1−α  h 1 αβ  (  h j  _ 1 − β ) α(1−β) ,
or, in logs,
(4) ln y j ′ = (1 − α) ln  e j + αβ ln  h 1 
 + α(1 − β) ln  h j 
 − α(1 − β)ln(1 − β).
From this equation, we can compute the per-
centage increase in human capital of students on 
island j = 2, … , N as
  ln  y j ′ _ y j = αβ ln  
 h 1  _  h j 
 + α(β − 1)ln(1 − β) > 0.
Note that both terms on the right-hand side of the 
equality are positive, and that they jointly com-
prise the “technology windfall” mentioned in the 
introduction. The first term captures the benefits 
of substitution of  h 1 for  h j in ( web-based) lec-
turing activities. The second term captures the 
effect of greater hands-on instruction: because 
local teachers no longer need to lecture, they 
reallocate their time to hands-on instruction. 
Hands-on instruction thus rises by a factor of 
1/(1 − β). Together, these two effects estab-
lish our first claim from the introduction, that 
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all students on nonleader islands benefit from 
 web-based education.
Our second claim, concerning the “democra-
tizing effect” of web-based education, also fol-
lows from equation (4). Consider two islands, j 
and k (≠ 1) with  h j <  h k (and thus by assump-
tion y j <  y k ). We then have
 ln   y k ′ _ 
y j ′ − ln  
 y k  _ y j = −αβ ln  
 h k  _  h j < 0,
implying that the human capital gap between the 
two islands will narrow after web-based educa-
tion proliferates. Moreover, this expression also 
implies that the larger the initial percentage dif-
ference between  h j and  h k , ln( h k / h j ), the larger 
the percentage point fall in the human capital 
gap. This is true regardless of the values of  e j and 
e k . Consequently, web-based education com-
presses human capital inequality across islands.
In fact, the result is even more stark: the 
 post-Internet regime has no effect on the educa-
tional attainment of students on the lead island 
and pulls up the post-schooling human capital 
of students on all other islands.5 Moreover, the 
model implies the possibility of local overtak-
ing: students on islands with endowments,  e j and 
h j , that are close to the lead island will overtake 
students on the lead island, because the stu-
dents on such close trailing islands receive the 
combined benefits of lead-island lectures and 
greater hands-on instruction from local teachers (i.e., hands-on instruction is scaled up by factor 
1/(1 − β)). After web-based education, the 
educational outcome of a trailing island exceeds 
the educational outcome of the lead island (ln  y j ′ > ln  y 1 ′ ) if and only if:
  (1 − α) _α(1 − β)  ln  
 e j 
 _  e 1 + ln  
 h j 
 _  h 1 > ln (1 − β).
5 One can imagine that if the time and effort of teachers 
on island 1 are diverted to Internet-related activities, stu-
dents on this island might be made worse off. Countering 
this, if teachers could increase the time they devote to lectur-
ing, this would increase their remuneration and may attract 
more talented, or simply more, agents into teaching. This 
would tend to benefit students on this island. 
C. Post-Internet: Teacher Wages
In the post-Internet allocation, a teacher’s 
marginal product and thus wages on islands 
j = 2, … , N is given by:
(5)  w j ′ = α(1 − β) e j 1−α  h 1 αβ (  h j  _ 1 − β ) α(1−β) .
This expression encapsulates both the third and 
fourth effects of web-based education on teacher 
earnings discussed in the introduction: “crowd-
out” and “complementarity”.
To see the “crowd-out” effect, note that 
 post-Internet teachers on islands j = 2, … , N 
will reallocate their time from instructional tasks 
in the complete task interval, [0, 1], to hands-on 
instruction tasks in the subinterval (β, 1]. Since 
there are diminishing returns to each teaching 
task i, this “crowd-out” will tend to depress 
teachers’ marginal products and earnings. If we 
compare (5), with the counterfactual assumption 
that  h 1 =  h j , to (3), we quantify this “crowd-
out” effect and find that  w j ′ <  w j .
The “complementarity” effect, on the other 
hand, is captured by the fact that  h 1 >  h j  —
inputs complementary to the services of local 
teachers have now increased, pushing up the 
marginal product and earnings of local teachers.
Combining these two effects and directly com-
paring (5) to (3), we see that the wages of domes-
tic teachers on island j will increase if and only if
(6)  (  h 1  _  h j ) αβ ( 1 − β ) 1−α(1−β) > 1.
This expression will be satisfied if island j ’s teach-
ers are not too close, in terms of their skills, to 
the teachers on island 1. However, the wages of 
teachers on islands with  h j sufficiently close to  h 1 (whom we call “middle skill” teachers) will fall.
In fact, we can use equation (6) to provide an 
explicit threshold at which a marginal introduc-
tion of web-based education (i.e., β close to zero) 
will increase local teachers’ wages. Taking logs 
on both sides of equation (6), we see that teach-
ers’ wages on island j will increase if and only if
  
αβ ln   h 1  _  h j 
  _  (α(1 − β) − 1) ln ( 1 − β )  > 1.
To evaluate this ratio for small β, we take the 
limit as β → 0 and use L’Hôpital’s rule. We see 
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that teachers’ wages on island j will increase 
with the introduction of a small amount of 
 web-based education if and only if
 ln   h 1  _  h j >  
1 _ α − 1.
For any value of α, then, there exists a threshold  _ hα 
such that in all islands with  h j <  _ hα , the wages of 
teachers will increase following the introduction of 
web-based education. Moreover, as α approaches 
1,  
_ hα approaches  h 1 , making it more likely that 
teacher wages will increase on all islands.6
II. Conclusion
There is substantial uncertainty about the 
ultimate impact of web-based educational 
innovations. Our stylized model suggests that, 
in contrast to the disequalizing effects of many 
other disruptive technologies, web-based edu-
cation will have broadly equalizing effects. 
Not only will human capital around the globe 
be enhanced, but human capital inequality may 
also decrease. At the same time, many (though 
not all) teachers will prosper.
Our model was purposefully chosen to be highly 
simplified, and thus leaves out many relevant and 
interesting issues. First, we have abstracted from 
occupational choice. Changes in teachers’ wages 
will induce entry and exit from this occupation. 
This is potentially complicated by the fact that 
web-based  technologies will also change wages in 
nonteaching occupations.
Second, a major issue in the economics of edu-
cation is changing costs. On the one hand, these 
new web-based technologies require computers 
and broadband access, which are costly for stu-
6 Our model also implies that there will be no change in 
the wages of teachers on island 1. This is a consequence of 
the fact that the pre- and post-Internet allocations on this 
island are identical: a fraction β of teachers are still working 
on lecturing tasks and the remaining 1 − β are working on 
hands-on instruction. The latter have the same marginal prod-
uct as before, in terms of their contribution to student human 
capital. Several assumptions we have made for simplicity are 
important for this result. For example, if the amount of time 
teachers on island 1 devote to lecturing could increase, if there 
were human capital differences among these teachers, or if 
agents with higher human capital could enter teaching, then 
the earnings of island 1 teachers would also increase in the 
post-Internet allocation. Nevertheless, this result highlights 
that any increase in inequality between the very top teachers 
and the rest in the post-Internet era may be limited. 
dents in many regions. On the other hand, these 
new technologies will economize on textbooks 
and other nonweb resources. Our analysis also 
suggests that the teacher wage bill may increase 
or decrease.
Third, we have abstracted from within-country 
inequality of student endowments. For example, 
web-based education may be less equalizing if 
the already-advantaged students have dispro-
portionate access to the web. The extent of this 
effect, especially its magnitude relative to the 
equalizing effects we have identified, is an inter-
esting area for empirical study.
Finally, web-based delivery of educational 
resources may lower the cost of experimenting 
with new teaching techniques and acquiring feed-
back on what works and why. These experiments 
may lead us to deeper insights about the education 
production function. In this way, recent educa-
tional innovations may not only help us teach our 
students; they may also help us teach ourselves.
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